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Genre’s Autonomy, Autonomy’s Genre 
 
The question of genre fiction holds a surprisingly central place in Nicholas Brown’s Autonomy. It has 
also been a key issue for me in my research—in fact, I have tried various versions of Brown’s argument 
about the way genre fiction—“commercial genre,” in the formulation Brown chooses before his longest 
explanation of the argument—“opens up a zone of autonomy within the heteronomous space of cultural 
commodities” (25). I took the argument from an earlier sketch (“Close Reading”), which however has 
survived unchanged into the book version; and have repeatedly tried to make it do the work I needed 
(see “Introduction,” Books, and Lanzendörfer and Schimmelpfennig)—in different ways, indicating the 
way that I have struggled with the argument’s workings, and its validity. That I have stuck with it—and 
been stuck with it—is down to two things that I find incessantly fascinating: first, Brown’s argument 
about genre fiction appears to recuperate it as potentially as useful—and certainly as meaningful—as 
ostensibly more socially powerful, so-called literary fiction; in the most radical formulation of this, as 
Rachel Greenwald Smith has summarized Brown’s argument: “Genre reinstates the authority of form 
and makes meaningful art possible again” (Smith 297).  
This is a radical and necessary move, not least because of 
the often-remarked turn to genre fiction in contemporary 
writing, but also because of the shifts in the disciplinary 
outlook at large that a full recuperation of genre-writing—
indeed, in Smith’s formulation, a turn towards genre as the 
sole source of meaningful art—would bring. Secondly, 
however, I find Brown’s account of genre as such 
interesting; or perhaps better, I find it perplexing. Or 
perhaps even better, I think it is wrong. And so what I want 
to do in this brief essay is two things. On the one hand, I 
want to think through what Brown’s argument is actually 
about: is it about “genre” writ large, as a literary category? 
Is it about genre fiction, a narrower category which is largely 
historically specific and contingent? Or is it about “generic” 
motifs, which need not cohere into an argument about 
genre? And I’ll suggest that while Brown’s account of genre 
as it stands seems to be wrong, a better account of genre 
can be fashioned that still retains the essential features of 
Brown’s. 
There is not much of an account of genre in the book in 
the first place, to be sure. Brown offers this early on: 
 
Why should genre fiction be a zone of autonomy? A commercial genre—already marketable or it would not be a 
genre—is also governed by rules. The very thing that invalidates genre fiction in relation to modernist 
autonomy—“formulas,” Adorno called them—opens up a zone of autonomy within the heteronomous space of 
cultural commodities, allowing the commodity character to be addressed as an aspect of the material support. 
The requirements are rigid enough to pose a problem, which can now be thought of as a formal problem like the 
problem of the flatness of the canvas or the pull of harmonic resolution. “Subverting the genre” means doing 
the genre better, just as every modernist painting had to assume the posture of sublating all previous 
modernisms. Dressing up the genre in fine production values, embellishing it with serious or local content, 
abandoning it in favor of arty imagery, borrowing its elements for effect, meandering into other genres or into 
other kinds of narrative—all of these are, on the contrary, mere attractions, excuses for the enjoyment of the 
genre itself (which needs no excuse), and therefore confirm the product as a commodity like any other. Producing 
the genre as a problem to which the work represents a solution involves, by contrast, an essentially deductive 
approach to the given form: the genre appears as a pure given that has to be successfully confronted, such that 
the support—in this case, the commodity character of the work—can be acknowledged and overcome in the 
same gesture. (25-26) 
 
I quote this at length because, for all the work that the idea of genre does in the book (it supports, 
after all, the entirety of the chapter on The Wire, and given that Brown understands it as formally similar 
to the “flatness of the canvas or the pull of harmonic resolution,” is also directly tied into the rest of the 
argument), this is a very short passage indeed. It also opens questions. What are the rules that govern 
a genre, and who establishes them? In how far is any particular genre—“a genre”—“like” harmonic 
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resolution, and not, say, “like” a fugue—which is to say, a named musical “genre” with clear-cut formal 
requirements? These questions have no answers in Brown beyond, I think, understanding them all as 
similarly formal problems, a point which rests, however, fully on the assumption that a genre is a formal 
category in the first place—that any genre is as formally, and perhaps only formally, limiting as a 
rectangular, flat, white canvas. I remain unsure of the paralleling that is happening here, which presents 
a literally material object—a flat canvas—as homologous to what amounts to a historically conditioned 
psychological structure—the “pull of harmonic resolution”—and to a rather more complex literary 
sociological category, genre fiction—indeed, in Brown’s account, to any particular genre in all the genres 
of genre fiction.1 
Part of the problem here seems to be that the word “genre” does different work at different times in 
Brown’s brief sketch of his argument. As Jeremy Rosen points out, this is a feature of much engagement 
with genre: “we use the same word to refer to preexisting frameworks and recognizable formulae, to 
which all texts and speech acts have recourse, and to a particular subset of the cultural field and 
marketplace that has been viewed, historically, in pejorative terms” (n.p.). This is a problem for Brown’s 
argument only in so far, I think, as there is actually no distinguishing between the “commercial genres” 
(25) and everything else, as I think his own argument in Chapter 2 already suggests: there, we might 
suggest, “experience” functions very much like the stock character of the detective in crime fiction. Jim 
Collins, in a related argument, has suggested that “bona fide aesthetic experiences” (223) are in fact 
the major generic point of one subset of contemporary literary fiction, which is, in turn, readable as “a 
genre in its own right” (McGurl 42), even if we may yet have to shift our sense of what a “genre element” 
is in order to see the force of this. The first point to note then is that Jacques Derrida’s old point that 
there is no genreless text (65) actually takes on some more force under current market conditions—to 
turn Brown’s formulation around, anything in the market is already a genre, or it would not be 
marketable. The second problem is that the particular generic formation which Brown seems to be 
after—“genre fiction”—does not work the way Brown would have it. Jeremy Rosen points out that 
“recognizing that genres typically have no fixed rules points to the problem with Nicholas Brown’s 
argument that working within the genres of genre fiction ‘opens up a zone of autonomy’” (n35). As 
Rosen points out, there are actually very few rigid requirements in most genres, if we understand these 
as somehow externally imposed, even if historically contingent, which is to say as anything “like” the 
flatness of the canvas. If you go to an arts supply store, you will be able to purchase flat canvases—and 
flat canvases only. But there is no choice purveyor of rule books of science-fiction, say, or of a list of 
necessary features of the police procedural, because these things—rules and checklists—do not in fact 
exist. Rosen suggests that ultimately, it makes most sense to understand “genre fiction” and “literary 
fiction” as “not formally constituted ones, but rather [as names for] subsets of the larger literary field 
and marketplace.” He suggests that “while we might expect to find certain formal features in these 
categories—fast-paced plot, streamlined prose, lots of dialogue, reader expectations routinely met, in 
genre fiction, or poetic language, depth of psychology, and social acumen in literary fiction—these 
designations are not primarily formal” (n.p.). Genre, in other words, is always “a certain structure within 
which one can move” (Brown, Autonomy 169), not just in the exceptional understanding of The Wire, 
which is what Brown is talking about. 
Rosen’s point is not easily gainsaid, and much of the validity and usefulness of Brown’s argument 
rests on the idea that genre is formally limiting to such an extent that only in the act of “subverting” it, 
of “doing the genre better” (26) can the commodity character of any work—its nature as an art-
commodity—be overcome. If there is nothing, or at any rate nothing fixed, that it is possible to 
acknowledge and overcome, then there is no subversion, and thus no autonomy. Brown understands, 
of course, that in order for the distinction between embracing the form of genre fiction and inverting 
 
1 Brown, I think, departs from the observation that the canvas is a historically contingent material precondition, just 
like eight-tone harmonic music and genre fiction; and to an extent, I can’t really argue with it. Nonetheless, it strikes 
me that the materiality of the canvas specifically as a material object, if not as this specific material object, stands 
in some contrast still to the non-materiality of both harmonic resolution and of genre fiction. If nothing else, it does 
so historically: generalizing somewhat, no musical work between the general adoption of tonality and the invention 
of twelve-tone music did without harmonic resolution, and few paintings were painted on anything but a flat, paint-
receptive surface (if maybe not solely on canvas). But from the earliest days of “genre” fiction, the so-called “rules” 
of the genre were broken even as they were being worked out, as it were. (See, for example, the otherwise 
nonsensical account of the key “rules” of the detective genre in Franco Moretti’s Graphs, Maps, Trees (2005), which 
while trying to develop a theory of why Sherlock Holmes is still read shows the immense breadth of different 
approaches to the detective genre.). This may be saying little more than that the restrictiveness of the rules between 
these allegedly similar categories is different, and perhaps to suggest that it is so different as to require us to rethink 
the categories. 
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it—to make it meaningful—to be legible (165), readers must first be able to identify the genre of genre 
fiction; and I think that means for Brown what must “be freely assumed,” be freely accepted, before it 
can be “legibly subordinated to the logic of the work” are the “rules” of the genre (166). Thus, for 
example, in Brown’s example of The Wire, it may be the “driven police detective” (164) or the 4:3 aspect 
ratio which are freely assumed by the work; and it is (also) the “genre figure of the driven police 
detective” which makes The Wire able to produce “its own, internal purposiveness” (177)—to become a 
work of art.  
I have little interest in quibbling with Brown’s analysis, except to suggest that the inclusion of a 
recognizable genre figure (and there is ample ground to accept Brown’s claim that the driven detective 
is a stock figure) does not, in any meaningful way, make a work genre fiction. Brown never explicitly 
claims this link, but I think it is an inevitable and important part of his claim: if genres are governed by 
rules, then these rules must make genres: the “ensemble of genre elements” (159) is the genre, whilst 
their deformation is the immanent possibility of meaning. The difference between The Bourne Identity 
and The Wire is not their use of genre elements as such, but the way they are used. “The conventions 
are the framework that, like the frame in painting, must be neutralized by the work for immanent 
purposiveness to hold sway;” like it makes no sense to say that any painting is not painted on a canvas 
anymore after we have established that it is a work of art, it makes no sense to say that any work 
ceases to be of a genre once it has done that genre one better. And perhaps more importantly than that 
even, the various genre elements are only really limiting in genre fiction: the driven detective of crime 
thrillers becomes, in “literary” fiction, simply another character, if one with allusive relations to genre 
fiction. But all the same, to posit that any particular genre element makes a work a work of genre—and 
thus rule-bound—seems to be a conundrum, because again: What are the rules? Who sets the rules? 
Who determines what is a genre element in the first place?  
I think it is possible to solve this problem, and possibly this solution is even the one that Brown 
intents, though it is never explicitly spelled out. This solution will certainly, however, be in the vein of 
Brown’s argument. I suggest we need to subsume the question of what genre fiction is—a question 
which remains important—under Brown’s larger argument for the primacy of the interpretative act. That 
is to say: I think very little of Brown’s argument for the possibility of finding spaces of autonomy in 
genre fiction—or indeed, in any fiction, understanding that all fiction in the contemporary moment is a 
form of generic fiction. But the importance of the claim Brown raises is, as I will conclude, firmly one 
for genre fiction—changes when we take both the claim to a particular work’s productive subversion of 
genre conventions and its initial claim to be genre fiction in the first place to be something that is not 
simply a given, but rather something that is “analytically available” (8). I want to say that Brown’s 
persuasive account of how “artworks suspend their commodity character” (24) only under observation, 
namely when you “catch [them] in the act,” and “plausibly ascribe meaning to actual works, an ascription 
that is itself a claim that the work in question belongs to the institution of art” also names a necessary 
first step in the argument about genre fiction. 
Jeremy Rosen asks, apropos of the notion of genre as a set of rules, or a contract between writer 
and reader: “But what kind of contract is genre? Readers can’t ask for their money back if expectations 
aren’t met” (n56); and again, Rosen is correct to question this account of genre. My suggestion is that 
readers need not ask for their money back, as it were, because they are constitutively part of the genre-
making in the first place: if their expectations of any work are not met, than that work is simply not a 
work of genre fiction, very much irrespective of the genre elements it contains. I do believe this is a 
change of argument from Brown, who suggests at one point that “the rules that underlie what we can 
see, as genre conventions, [are] understood because the conventions themselves are already known” 
(159). But “known,” in this phrasing, seems to do too much heavy lifting. It seems too much to spell 
something external, something that can be easily referred to: “this is the police procedural.” In this 
argument, a proposition like “David Simon’s The Wire is an autonomous work of art, because it does 
the police procedural one better” (which I take to be the gist of Brown’s Chapter 4) would actually be a 
proposition in two parts. The first would be the ascription of genre itself: “The Wire is a police 
procedural.” That is by no means clear cut, anyway, especially when in later seasons, the focus of the 
show shifts away from the police. To borrow from Brown again: “The only way to make such an ascription 
compelling is through close interpretative attention” (25). Like the act of interpretation of the work of 
art, the act of naming a text “genre fiction” thus becomes inescapably intersubjective. It cannot but 
compare the work to examples already known, of course, but it does not simply check it against known 
genre conventions: rather, it continuously makes genre conventions in the very act of establishing a 
work’s “sufficient” adherence to them. Crucially, this does not mean that we do away with the problem 
of form, or with form as a problem. As Rosen notes, in the set of conditions which contemporaneously 
identify genre fiction, some version of a formal property remains operative. We are certainly capable of 
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having, say, zombie fiction without zombies; detective fiction without clues; paintings without paint; or 
even music without notes. But we will not have a generic ascription without any kind of formal relation 
to the genre ascribed: The Remains of the Day is not a zombie novel without zombies because nothing 
about would allow this plausible ascription, to a large extent because formally nothing about it would 
suggest so. Even if the novel’s author and publisher, misguidedly, chose to so designate it so (to “name” 
it for the marketplace), such a categorization would probably be of insufficient force to make anybody 
read it as zombie fiction. But conversely, whatever may be held by author or publisher, The Buried Giant 
seems to be well capable of plausibly being named “fantasy,” very much on the basis of its formal 
qualities and apart from its placement in the market. In each and every such case, however, we would 
have to say that there is no adjudicating instance for these generic ascriptions, no way of making the 
determination stick beyond intersubjective agreement with them: they are developed only in argument. 
So although I have formulated in the declarative, really what I’ve just outlined are in fact two 
argumentative claims about Kazuo Ishiguro’s works: only debate will be able to settle the persuasiveness 
of these claims. But in each case, I think it is undeniable that the respective forms of The Buried Giant 
and The Remains of the Day will have to play a role in this debate. In as much as form thus remains 
constitutively a part of the process of compelling generic ascription, genre also remains a formal 
problem—but one whose boundaries are less fixed than any set of rules. 
If this is the first proposition, the second proposition in “David Simon’s The Wire is an autonomous 
work of art, because it does the police procedural one better”—which I think is Brown’s—then, should 
be understood to rest on the first: only if we can plausibly ascribe The Wire the name of detective 
procedural can we then also think through the question of whether The Wire exceeds the genre of the 
police procedural, whether it understands its formal limitations as productive and also makes them 
productive, and seek to convince others of the validity of our argument. That may seem paradoxical, 
and perhaps it is: only in the agreement that The Wire is a police procedural can we also find room to 
agree that it subverts the police procedural. Only in agreeing that Zone One is a zombie novel can we 
also find room to agree that it does the zombie novel one better.  Perhaps a better way of phrasing this 
is to suggest that there is a hint of dialectics in here: works of art, we would then say, sublate the 
inherent contradictions of a genre under total commodification, in being at once of the market and not. 
The final question, then, is what this does for genre fiction as such. If I am right in adapting Brown’s 
argument, I think, the most profound change in literary critical practice must accrue to our work with 
genre fiction of all kinds. Half of this claim derives from the notion that under contemporary market 
conditions, all fiction is some kind of genre fiction. For literary fiction, on which we expend most of our 
critical energy, this means no major change: our interpretative practice is already geared towards it. 
But for genre fiction, Brown’s arguments amount to a sea-change. “A work’s assertion of autonomy is 
the claim that its form is self-legislating. Nothing more” (182), Brown says. But also nothing less. What 
Brown’s argument for genre fiction does is to remove from it any kind of stigma at all: no work, wherever 
in the marketplace it has been put, can raise a claim to meaning avant la lecture, as it were. To quote 
again from Brown, though this time without the leeway I gave myself before: “The only way to make 
[an ascription of meaning] compelling is through close interpretive attention” (25). We should take this 
seriously, I think, in all its implications. Genre fiction is in need of interpretative attention no less, if no 
more, than ostensibly more (politically, socially, aesthetically) meaningful literary fiction. What changes 
for literary fiction, then, is that some of it may be plausibly “demoted” to mere art-commodity—this is 
Brown’s intervention in something like the claims about literary fictions genericity that I have offered 
above from McGurl and Collins. What changes for genre fiction is everything: it becomes exactly as 
much an object of interpretation, of the plausible ascription of meaning, and in the most forceful of 
Brown’s claims, precisely because its formal problems appear more straightforward and more widely 
recognized, perhaps more readily readable as formal problems in the first place, may, in fact, take 
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